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Abstract: This paper adopts transaction costs perspective to explain why growth of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) may vary across regions of an emerging economy. Furthermore, it is argued that young and 
small firms gain more from improvement of local governance than old and large firms do. In addition, 
depending on the institutional history, SMEs will respond differently to the incentives provided by local 
governance. Analysing more than 300,00 SMEs in Vietnam during the 2006-2012 period, it is shown that 
higher quality local governance positively influences local SME revenue growth; this effect is stronger for 
young and small firms, and matters more where institutional history suggests less support for entrepreneurship. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This article adopts the transaction costs / new institutional economics framework to examine how aspects of 
local governance affect business performance. The transaction costs that will be considered correspond to 
corruption and lack of transparency, which are functionally related (COLLIER et al., 2002; MCCULLOCH et 
al., 2013). Corruption relates to the power of public office being used as a rent-seeking tool for personal 
benefits, contravening the rules of the game (JAIN, 2001). Lack of transparency implies an uneven distribution 
of information among economic agents that are not dissimilar (DU and MICKIEWICZ, 2016). Both corruption 
and lack of transparency increase the transaction costs of doing business. Parallel to this, under a weak 
governance environment where regulatory frameworks are unclear and underdeveloped, the creativity, 
flexibility, and cleverness of local governments to interpret and implement central policies (as well as to design 
their own initiatives for the local entrepreneurship sector1) are particularly important.  This is even more the 
case where the local officials are rewarded for local economic performance (WEINGAST, 1995). Nonetheless, 
this aspect of governance is largely ignored in existing literature2. 
This paper proposes that the above features of local governance affect the transaction costs that local businesses 
face and are therefore crucial for their performance (DAVIDSSON and HENREKSON, 2002; STENHOLM et 
al., 2013). It is moreover expected that local governance has more influence on the performance of young and 
small businesses than it has on the old and large ones (DU and MICKIEWICZ, 2016); and, as will be explored, 
it is here that the transaction costs perspective offers good insights. 
However, local governance may be endogenous (SANTARELLI and TRAN, 2012). A province with a 
developed entrepreneurial sector may be subject to more pressure to improve the quality of governance. To 
address the direction of causality effect, this paper makes use of several instruments for assessing local 
governance quality, including the tenure of provincial leaders, the frequency of change in leadership, and the 
number of years that leaders stay in power (MCCULLOCH et al., 2013). These variables are strongly correlated 
with local governance quality but are uncorrelated with local firms’ growth performance. The IV-GMM 
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technique is employed to analyse a panel of more than 300,000 observations of SMEs operating in 63 provinces 
of Vietnam during the 2006-2012 period, and the results support the positive effects of local governance quality 
on SMEs’ growth performance. 
It is also postulated that local governance matters more in those regions where institutional history renders less 
support for entrepreneurship: entrepreneurial performance may be also affected by long-term cultural 
persistence. To explore this, a historical event, exogenous to the development process of SMEs in Vietnam, is 
utilised: the 1954 Geneva Conference partitioned the country into two states, North and South Vietnam. The 
former was supported by China and Russia, and the latter was supported by the US (MAKINO and TSANG, 
2011). In 1975 the North Vietnamese army captured the South, unifying the two states and establishing the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. This study reveals that even four decades after reunification, there is a difference 
in the way the economic institutions work in the South as compared with the North. In particular, and consistent 
with the argument that will be presented below, the effects of variation in local governance in the North are 
more significant than in the South. The quality of governance becomes more important where it needs to 
compensate for the lack of culturally-embedded business tradition. 
More generally, this article’s contribution is to utilise concepts taken from the transaction costs theory to 
provide a better understanding of the impact of the regional business environment on entrepreneurial 
performance. Following DU and MICKIEWICZ (2016) this paper breaks the implicit assumption that the 
country-wide constitutional configurations in emerging market economies have homogenous effects on the 
entrepreneurship sector. The results suggest that business performance is impacted by both the low-level 
policies and regulations, and the persistent high-level informal institutions. Finally, by forming transaction costs 
theory-based priors on the expected differential impact of governance on SMEs (conditional on their age and 
size) and testing these, this study complements existing works that do not consider such interactive effects 
(BECK et al., 2008). 
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Our findings are of paramount importance to policymakers. The results imply that business performance is 
strongly influenced by local governance quality, and by policies which can be amended and improved in the 
short and medium-term (CHARRON and LAPUENTE, 2013; PARKS and OAKERSON, 2000; SAVITCH and 
VOGEL, 2000; YE, 2009). 
CONTEXT: BUSINESS PERFORMANCE AND INSTITUTIONS IN VIETNAM 
Vietnam is an interesting context for studying local governance arrangements and their influence on SMEs, due 
to its on-going economic and political transformation. In 1991, on the promulgation of the Company Law, 
private businesses were legalized; and have been encouraged since 1999 following the amendment of the Law, 
as entry barriers for the private sector were reduced. Despite its recent establishment and fragile development, 
the private sector contributed considerably to the economic growth of Vietnam (NGUYEN and DIJK, 2012; 
NGUYEN et al., 2013; TRAN and SANTARELLI, 2014). The private sector accounts for 95% of total 
registered capital, 65% of national revenue, 97% of registered businesses, and 64% of employees3. 
In North Vietnam industries were built from scratch according to the Soviet blueprint, whereas South Vietnam 
was transformed away from a market economy only after 1975. It switched to economic liberalisation with the 
rest of Vietnam in the 1990s. This historical diversity can be treated as an exogenous factor that is reflected in 
the differences in local informal institutions across regions of Vietnam (MAKINO and TSANG, 2011). 
Moreover, the differences in informal institutions are expected to persist, despite the political unification four 
decades ago. 
In addition, variations in local institutions have been magnified as a result of the extensive decentralisation 
program during the Doimoi process4 (LAN PHI and ANWAR, 2011). The foundation of this program was the 
promulgation of the 1996 (revised in 1998) State Budget Law, which grants local governments autonomy in 
their fiscal strategies. Local governments are considerably independent of central government in their income 
and expenditure decisions, and they have substantial freedom to determine their own governance and regulatory 
frameworks for local businesses. 
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Compared with China, the entrepreneurship sector in Vietnam is much younger and smaller, and may therefore 
be more sensitive to local governance environments (COOKE and LIN, 2012). This makes Vietnam a relevant 
(and arguably more interesting) context for examining the impacts of local institutions on the growth of young 
and small businesses than is the better understood Chinese context (DU and MICKIEWICZ, 2016). 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
WILLIAMSON (1985), in his seminal work on transaction costs, builds on COASE (1937) and argues that 
when the type of organisation matches the attributes of its chosen economic activity, this leads to superior 
performance. These core attributes relate to the extent of cognitive complexity, asset specificity, and 
behavioural risks (of opportunism). Here, transaction is a generic term that denotes any value-generating form 
of human cooperation, and an overarching concept is that of minimising transaction costs. In other words, the 
transaction costs of the given form of an organisation is the mirror image of the organisation’s effectiveness. 
Institutions represent a different, broader form of human organisation (WILLIAMSON, 2000) but they, too, 
affect the transaction costs faced by those who engage in value-enhancing (economic) cooperation. This impact 
of institutions on economic organisations leads to the problem of matching between the type of economic 
organisation and the type of institutional environment; matching that, again, has implications for which types of 
firms perform best. 
While the classic presentation of the transaction costs theory (WILLIAMSON, 1985) assumes a mature market 
economy as its institutional context, a generalised approach (WILLIAMSON, 2000) accounts for variety in 
institutions, and therefore extends the analysis to the emerging markets. Institutions differ from organisations in 
that they are more difficult to change.  There are also levels of institutions.  In particular, one may distinguish 
between the most stable level of informal institutions (i.e., culture), long-term constitutional rules, and lower 
level government regulations (ESTRIN et al., 2013). 
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From the transaction costs perspective, the most key dimension of the high (constitutional) level of institutions 
relates to the security of property rights.  Secure property rights are a feature of effective constraints on the 
executive branch of the government; constraints which typically come from a strong and independent judiciary 
(ESTRIN et al., 2013). This is the feature missing in most of the developing economies (EASTERLY and 
KRAAY, 2000). However as noticed by WEINGAST (1995), its absence may be partly compensated by 
‘market supporting federalism’; that is, interregional competition combined with officials being rewarded on 
regional economic performance. This model applies to China, drawing on its tradition of meritocracy 
(FUKUYAMA, 2011), but also to Vietnam, which makes it an interesting case to explore.    
Federalism implies a variation in local governance across space (EFENDIC et al., 2015); thus, the phenomena 
located at the lower level of institutional hierarchy (as defined by WILLIAMSON, 2000) become increasingly 
relevant. 
In transition economies, such as Vietnam’s, business environments are partially shaped by market systems but 
remain subject to the discretionary actions of governments. Furthermore, there is pronounced uncertainty 
induced by the political and economic transition. This ambiguity of formal institutions suggests that local 
governance and informal institutions (cultural settings) play a remarkable role in shaping local business 
environments. However, the literature has yet to help us understand the exact nature of these local forces, and 
the possible mechanisms of their impacts on local entrepreneurship performance (COOKE and LIN, 2012).  
 Below, we utilise the transaction costs / institutional theory perspective to examine how aspects of local 
governance, including corruption, transparency, and proactivity, influence local SMEs’ performance, and how 
such effects may be moderated by firm age and size, and the informal institutions. 
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Local governance and entrepreneurship performance 
Here, corruption is defined as the abuse or misuse of public authority by government officials and politicians, in 
order to serve their private interests, by taking advantage of their decision rights over the allocation of benefits. 
There are three reasons for the influence of corruption on SMEs’ performance, all based on the transaction costs 
arguments. 
First, corruption impedes value-enhancing business cooperation because it implies “the change in time frame 
within which occurs the desired action” (HUSTED, 1994). It gives rise to delays, or imposes constraints on 
entrepreneurs in gaining access to productive resources. Corrupt bureaucracies may delay the distribution of 
permits and licences, thereby slowing down the process through which new ventures could be established 
(NORTH, 1990).  
Second, bureaucratic government may create barriers to information in order to benefit from corruption 
(CAETANO and CALEIRO, 2009).  In order to explain that kind of behaviour we need to reach beyond the 
narrow neoclassical economic theory, and allow for the possibility of opportunism. Moreover, as argued by 
(HUSTED, 1994), with respect to corruption we see another aspect that is at the core of the transactions cost 
perspective: “cognitive limitations are significant … especially as one faces large bureaucratic structures in 
many third world countries, it often becomes difficult to know” with whom to transact in a corrupt way to get 
things done. 
This also implies that entrepreneurs may need to develop specific human capital: that is, the local competence 
and knowledge that facilitates operating in the corrupt environment (HUSTED, 1994). Entrepreneurs have to 
invest more time and effort in building relational capital with local governments (DU and MICKIEWICZ, 2016; 
MCCULLOCH et al., 2013). Moreover, they need to protect their specific investments, forging trust relations 
anchored in repeated transactions between the donor and the recipient (HUSTED, 1994). Yet, this shifts 
entrepreneurial efforts from productive activities to rent-seeking activities, which may hamper growth. 
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Finally, there is the direct financial costs of corruption. HUNT and LASZLO (2012) and (ESTRIN et al., 2013) 
propose that corruption could be regarded as a kind of tax. Thus, without corruption, small and medium-sized 
businesses could reduce their costs, improve competitive advantage, and eventually their performance. In this 
context, HUSTED (1994) distinguishes between two types of corruption. With the ‘market corruption’, dealings 
are standardised: they relate to activities such as obtaining business permits, and may come with unofficial but 
commonly known prices that affect costs. In contrast, the ‘parochial corruption’ relates to larger, more 
idiosyncratic transactions, like large construction contracts. Here specific human capital and competence may 
play a decisive role (HUSTED, 1994). 
Turning to the second, related dimension of governance, the degree of administrative transparency is both a 
factor that may amplify corruption (COLLIER et al., 2002) and an important direct determinant of local SMEs’ 
performance. Lack of transparency typically concerns the uneven distribution of information that leads to 
uneven distribution of resources (e.g. capital) between economic actors that are not dissimilar (DU and 
MICKIEWICZ, 2016). The cost of acquiring and processing information increases.  
Specifically, in the case of Vietnam, the non-transparent distribution of information on planning regulations and 
the legal documents necessary to run businesses, and the poor communication to firms of any new policies and 
laws, were found to negatively influence regional performance (HANSEN et al., 2009). Parallel to the impact of 
corruption, non-transparency requires entrepreneurs to build political connections in order to obtain access to 
resources (MCCULLOCH et al., 2013), implying higher transaction costs; yet unlike corruption it does not 
automatically involve illegal activities. Again, however, effort is allocated to unproductive activities. 
As already argued, in common with many emerging market economies, Vietnam’s constitutional features do not 
offer effective constraints on the executive branch of the government, which implies there are no strong 
guarantees for private property rights. However, as in China, this effect is partly alleviated by market-
supporting federalism (WEINGAST, 1995)and elements of meritocracy conducive to regional competition: 
local governors are evaluated according to regional performance, and they are endowed with sufficient scope of 
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decision rights to make this competition meaningful. This implies that besides the two interconnected aspects of 
corruption and transparency, the local leadership’s proactivity is important. 
Incompleteness of laws and institutions is a feature stressed by the transaction costs theory. These 
characteristics relate even more to transition economies. Weak and incomplete formal institutions imply, in 
turn, that there are other ways in which local authorities may proactively create an entrepreneurship-friendly 
business environment. One of the approaches is to be creative and clever in implementing central policy, and 
working within sometimes unclear national regulatory frameworks so as interpret them in favour of local 
private firms (GREEN and MOSER, 2013). 
In general, local governance features such as freedom from corruption, administration transparency, and 
proactivity in planning and implementing business policies, could reduce local transaction costs.  They are 
therefore expected to be important determinants of SMEs’ growth and performance. This leads us to the 
following hypotheses: 
H1: In a given region, (a) governmental transparency, (b) freedom from corruption, and (c) proactivity of the 
local leadership will be positively associated with local SMEs’ revenue growth. 
 
Factors moderating the effects of local governance 
Differences in transaction costs by firm’s age and size 
SMEs in Vietnam are on average very young and small (MEYER et al., 2006), and under weak institutional 
environments the incumbent, large companies are in an advantageous position (AIDIS et al., 2008). Another 
words, being old and large may condition positively on how the firm is impacted by the policy environment 
(DU and MICKIEWICZ, 2016). More generally, the literature on entrepreneurship widely recognizes that a 
young age and a small size are both liabilities to SMEs, preventing them from gaining full access to productive 
resources (DU and GIRMA, 2012; GIORDANI, 2015). This is for the following reasons.  
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First, young and small firms have yet to accumulate sufficient resources to build operational capability. 
Therefore, the higher transaction costs of accessing external resources impede their economic performance and 
growth.  
Second, young and small firms are confronted with a severe asymmetric information problem because they have 
yet to establish trackable operational records, or to successfully build trusts in their operations (NGUYEN and 
ROSE, 2009). NGUYEN et al. (2006) suggest that in the absence of effective market institutions and business 
data, banks in Vietnam face considerable uncertainties in lending to private firms. Consequently, banks employ 
a combination of uncertainty avoidance, and a reliance on trust in their lending decisions. An environment 
where signalling one’s own economic performance and potential for growth is more difficult, will 
disproportionately hamper the firms that are new and small.  
Third, consistent with the discussion above, under a corrupt and non-transparent local environment, firms need 
to develop specific human capital and skills, facilitating access to resources (HUSTED, 1994). With respect to 
petty ‘market’ corruption, where frequently repeated transactions imply unofficial prices paid for, say, easier 
access to information and resources, the specific skills may not be needed. However, in line with the transaction 
costs theory, this specific human capital becomes more important for larger, complex, and less standard 
operations, such as for example getting a large construction contract from the government; this may often imply 
multi-party unofficial bargaining. Developing such capabilities to efficiently engage with corruption takes time 
and resources, and that gives a comparative advantage to large and established companies. At the same time, 
such complex corrupt transactions create high gains, and this has implications for relative performance.  
Fourth and related, where transactions are not supported by governance (and formal governance cannot, by 
definition, support corrupt transactions), they may instead be supported by long-term relational capital 
(WILLIAMSON, 1985). Here, again, large and old firms may have an advantage in building such network 
capital, both because of repeated dealings and because of multiple parallel dealings. GOTO (2012) and 
SANTARELLI and TRAN (2013) suggest that social capital is particularly important in the case of Vietnamese 
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economy, where economic transactions are usually supported by personal relations rather than arm’s length 
principles. Yet again, local conditions differ, and so does the relative importance of (costly) relational capital 
versus formal governance. 
For all these reasons, in transition economies such as Vietnam’s, the processes of accumulating resources and 
alleviating cognitive constraints may be frustrating for young and small private companies (PINCUS, 2009). 
This leads us to expect that if local governments are able to reduce the average transaction costs for local 
businesses by being free from corruption, improving administration transparency, and being entrepreneurially 
proactive in their policies, young and small firms will gain more benefits than the old and large ones. Hence: 
H2: The effect of (a) local governmental transparency, (b) freedom from corruption, and (c) proactivity is 
stronger on small firms compared to large ones. 
H3: The effect of (a) local governmental transparency, (b) freedom from corruption, and (c) proactivity is 
stronger on young firms compared to old ones. 
Informal institutions 
We have just considered how the lowest level of (WILLIAMSON, 2000) institutional hierarchy (firms’ 
attributes) interact with the level of (local) policies and regulation. We argue however that local regulations and 
policies also interact with the highest institutional level: the norms, culture, and informal codes of conduct that 
are embedded in the shared cognition. Due to the incompleteness of formal institutions, the role of informal 
institutions is particularly significant in emerging countries (ZHOU, 2013). 
A number of empirical studies show that informal institutions differ significantly across regions within a 
country (MOODYSSON and ZUKAUSKAITE, 2014; PUR and MOORE, 2010; RODRÍGUEZ-POSE, 2013). 
This may then affect local entrepreneurship activities (FRITSCH and STOREY, 2014). A regional 
entrepreneurship-friendly culture, once established, tends to persist over time (FRITSCH and MUELLER, 
2004).  
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This has recently been investigated using the case of West and East Germany. FRITSCH and STOREY (2014) 
suggest that the social acceptance or legitimacy of entrepreneurship remains higher in the West than in the East, 
even after more than two decades of reunification. This is because the culture of the West is more tolerant to 
individualism, independence, innovation, and achievement. Similar results could be expected for Vietnam, 
where the South was exposed to more pro-entrepreneurial culture until 1975. This paper subscribes to the 
arguments of FRITSCH and WYRWICH (2014) that a regional culture of entrepreneurship could be regarded 
as a spatially sticky characteristic, and postulate that SMEs in the South of Vietnam, on average, perform better 
than SMEs in the North of Vietnam in terms of economic growth. 
In addition, it is suggested that in the regions with a weaker heritage of pro-entrepreneurial culture (the North), 
the impact of local governance is more significant. In other words, the quality of governance and proactive 
policies of local governments matter more where local informal institutions are less accommodating to 
entrepreneurship. That is, as the pro-entrepreneurial culture in the South already helps firms to achieve strong 
growth; the marginal effects of local governance on the firms in the South may be lower in comparison to the 
effects on the firms in the North. Good local governance, with strong commitments and stability over time, may 
be more important where there is a stronger need to offset the weaknesses in the formal and informal 
institutional structures (ESTRIN et al., 2013; see also: WILLIAMSON, 2000). Therefore, in summary: 
H4: The effect of (a) local governmental transparency, (b) freedom from corruption, and (c) proactivity is 
stronger on SMEs in North Vietnam regions compared to SMEs in South Vietnam regions. 
 
DATA AND VARIABLES 
Data 
Our empirical tests rely on a combination of several datasets. The first is the Annual Survey on Enterprises of 
Vietnam General Statistics Office (GSO). It is a 13-year panel from 2000 to 2012 containing firm-specific 
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information for all of the manufacturing, mining, and service sectors in the economy. However, the study period 
in this paper is seven years, 2006-2012, due to the availability of the second dataset: Provincial Competitiveness 
Index (PCI)5, which was first created for a sample of regions in 2005 and then for all of the 63 provinces and 
municipal cities. The survey is a product of the collaboration between the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce 
(VCCI) and the U.S Agency for International Development (USAID). PCI is a weighted average of the 9 sub-
indices, each measuring a different aspect of local governance. Consistent with the discussion above, the 
empirical analysis focuses on the Transparency, Informal Charge (corruption), and Proactivity indices, but 
below the results related to Legal Institutions are also presented. Definition and summary statistics of these 
indices are presented in Appendix 1. The third dataset is the GSO Provincial Annual Report, which includes 
information about provincial population, consumption, and the accumulated value of FDI and state-owned firms 
in the regions.  
Variables and summary statistics 
To clean the data, all the firms with negative total assets, fixed assets, depreciation and employees are dropped, 
and likewise those whose fixed assets are greater than their total assets. The outliers are controlled by censoring 
the top and bottom 1% of observations in the distributions of each variable used. Only small and medium-sized 
businesses (as defined by the Law on Enterprises of Vietnam) are selected6. The final sample in regressions 
constitutes 307,591 firm-year observations over 7 years. 
Dependent variables: revenue growth 
The dependent variable in this study is the revenue growth of SMEs, measured by the percentage change of 
sales revenue between two consecutive years. We focus on a firm’s growth taken as an indicator of overall 
performance. Unlike profits, it has the advantage of being more robust to the tax-avoidance accounting 
manipulation that is quite notorious in emerging market economies. However, we also test the robustness of the 
findings using profitability measures and the results remain similar.7  
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Table 1 shows the definition and summary statistics of the variables. On average, revenue growth of SMEs is 
around 5% per year. However, the large standard deviation, and a wide range between the minimum and the 
maximum values indicate considerable variations in the revenue performance. 
 
[Table 1 insert here] 
 
Independent variables: local governance quality 
For the freedom from corruption and administrative transparency measures, this paper uses two indices in the 
PCI dataset: Informal Charges, and Transparency. The former is a measure of how much firms pay in informal 
charges (bribes), how much of an obstacle those extra fees pose for their business operations, whether payment 
of those extra fees results in expected results or "services", and whether local officials use compliance with 
local regulations to extract rents.  
In turn, transparency is a measure of whether firms have access to the proper legal and planning documents 
necessary to run their businesses, whether those documents are equitably available, whether new policies and 
laws are communicated to firms and predictably implemented, and if the provincial webpage has a business-
related facility. 
In order to measure the proactivity of local government towards the entrepreneurship sector, this paper makes 
use of the Proactivity of Provincial Leadership index, which is a measure of the creativity and cleverness of 
local officials in implementing central policy, in designing their own initiatives for private sector development, 
and in working within sometimes unclear national regulatory frameworks to assist and interpret them in favour 
of local private firms. 
According to Table 1, change in freedom from corruption, with positive mean, is the only governance aspect 
that improved during the period. The other two governance dimensions: transparency and proactivity, both 
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change with negative means. Thus, the direction of the institutional transformation process remains ambiguous, 
consistent with  NGUYEN et al. (2013). However, within the country, there is significant institutional variation 
among provinces, represented by the wide range between the minimum and maximum values; likewise, the 
standard deviations are large. 
Control variables 
Following the literature, firm-specific covariates that have been previously found to significantly influence 
small and young businesses’ performance are included. They are: firm age, size, asset structure, and ownership. 
Firm age is measured as the number of years since an SME was established. Size is measured in the natural log 
of the number of employees an SME hires in a particular year. On average, SMEs in Vietnam are only 7 years 
old with about 44 employees. Assets structure variable is a ratio of fixed assets to total assets. 
To control for ownership sectors, three dummies are specified: for private, state-owned and foreign-owned 
SMEs. The private sector accounts for nearly 90% of total registered firms, the state sector is 6%, and the 
foreign sector is 4% of total firms. It should be noticed that observations are firm-years, in which a firm is 
allowed to change its ownership structure annually.  
In addition to firm-level control variables, entrepreneur-specific variables are also included (SANTARELLI and 
TRAN, 2012). Because the sampled firms are small and young, the owner-level determinants, such as owner 
age and education, are crucial in explaining the entrepreneurial performance of the firm. Therefore, owner age 
and gender are used. Age could be a good proxy for entrepreneurial experience, as older entrepreneurs may get 
more years of working and establishing networks. Meanwhile, gender could be a good proxy for education since 
in Vietnam, gender is highly correlated with access to education: male entrepreneurs are more likely to be well 
educated than their female counterparts (LESHKOWICH, 2015; RYDSTROM, 2015). 
To control for the macro-characteristics, several provincial level variables are included (SANTARELLI and 
TRAN, 2012, 2016). First, “construction per capita” is the per capita value of government spending on local 
infrastructure. Second, “consumption per capita” measures the average expense of each person in a particular 
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year in a province. The latter proxies the local economic level of development. Third, “FDI per capita” and 
“SOE per capita” are variables capturing the accumulated values of FDI and state-owned firms’ capital in each 
province. The two variables are normalised by the provincial population. The variable “distance” measures the 
distance from each province to the closest economic centre city8. This variable is to control for economic inter-
linkages across provinces. 
Finally, this paper also uses geography to proxy for the historical persistence of informal institutions. In 
particular, the seventeenth parallel was the provisional military demarcation line between North and South 
Vietnam, introduced by the Geneva Accords of 1954. This specific history allows us to create a dummy variable 
– the South, which takes the value of 1, for provinces to the south of the seventeenth parallel (which were far 
less exposed to the traditional type of Soviet command economy), and the North, which takes the value of 0 for 
provinces to the north of the parallel. 
 
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
The Hypotheses 1a-1c about the influence of local governance on the revenue growth of SMEs are tested using 
a growth equation in the following form: 
(𝟏𝟏) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�+ 𝛽𝛽3�𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 +  𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the revenue growth of an individual SME 𝐹𝐹 in province 𝑔𝑔 in year 𝑐𝑐. 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents a matrix of firm-level variables including firm age, firm size, ownership, 
and asset structure; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a matrix of two columns including owner age, and owner 
gender; and 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  includes province construction expenditures, consumption value, 
cumulative value of FDI as a proxy for the size of foreign sector, total capital of SOEs as a proxy for the size of 
state sector, and distance to the closest municipalities. The governance variables are in 
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𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, which consists of three aspects of local governance, i.e. freedom from corruption, 
administration transparency, and governmental proactivity. The model includes an industry-specific component 
𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 , and a time-specific component 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖, in form of dummies. The term 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 represents time-invariant, firm-level 
fixed effects. Finally, 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the idiosyncratic error. 
It is important to recognise that while local governance affects entrepreneurship, the effect may also be 
reversed: entrepreneurship development may influence the quality of institutions  (CARBONARA et al., 2016). 
Regions with a strong entrepreneurial sector may be subject to more bottom-up pressure to adopt business-
friendly governance. Given that the entrepreneurial sector is an important contributor to the development of 
emerging countries, the influence of local businesses on the local governance environment is expected to be 
present. 
To address this simultaneity (endogeneity) problem, this paper proposes the use of instrumental variables within 
the context of the generalised method of moments estimator (IV-GMM)9. In particular, external instrumental 
variables are employed to mitigate potential endogeneity. 
The key issue when looking for potential instruments was to find external variables that are correlated with the 
endogenous local governance variables, but are uncorrelated with firm growth performance. This paper suggests 
the following set of variables that meets these requirements. 
The first IV is the length of the period a provincial leader holds office. In Vietnam, power is centralised in the 
provincial leaders. Because the provincial leaders are appointed by central government, this variable is unlikely 
to be correlated with local business performance. At the same time, it is expected that the corruption, 
transparency, and proactivity of a province in a particular period are significantly dependent on the leader’s 
characteristics and period in office. In this study, period in office is measured by the number of months (average 
for a given year) that a leader is in his/her position. Yet a priori, good arguments can be advanced for this being 
both a negative and a positive relationship. On the one hand the longer the tenure, the more the local informal 
structures of special interests may become entrenched, leading to more corruption, less transparency and less 
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proactivity for the province. On the other hand, a short tenure may create incentives for rapid rent extraction10. 
We therefore remain neutral as to the expected sign of the effect. 
Second, measuring the changes of leaders, the “leader switch” dummy variable is used as an instrument for 
local governance variables. Because power is highly concentrated at the leaders’ disposal, and each leader may 
have idiosyncratic knowledge of local administration and a different management style, the switching of leaders 
in a province may initially trigger more corruption, less transparency, and less proactivity, due to a lack of 
knowledge by the incoming leader. Thus, while it is assumed that long tenure results in a deterioration of 
governance practice, a switch in leadership positions may also temporarily lead to a deterioration in local 
practices as a result of monitoring problems. The “leader switch” variable is a dummy which takes the value of 
1 if there is a change of provincial leader in a year, and value 0 otherwise. 
Finally, this paper also uses variables capturing the specific time points in tenure years that can make corruption 
more likely. The “third year” dummy take the value of 1 if a leader is in the third year of his tenure, and 0 
otherwise. According to the data, in actual practice leaders are most likely to be changed every three years. 
Therefore, in the third year of tenure, anticipating demotion, leaders may have more incentive to be corrupt, and 
to become less proactive. The fifth year may have similar effect – it is the last year in the five-year official 
tenure period of appointment by central government. The “fifth year” dummy takes value 1 if a leader is in the 
fifth year of his tenure, and 0 otherwise. 
An over-identification test is employed to investigate whether the external variables are truly exogenous. The 
Hansen (J) tests confirm the validity of the suggested IV. Moreover, we also test multicollinearity among the 
regressors using VIF test and find no evidence of its presence (Table 2). However, using the Cumby-Huizinga 
test for autocorrelation of the current error term with the error terms up to five lags, we find that autocorrelation 
is significant. Following that, we estimate the equations with HAC - heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation -  
robust standard errors, choosing a bandwidth of five (the highest possible, considering the time length of the 
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data used). The use of bandwidth, combined with robust HAC SEs, produces estimates that are robust to both 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation. 
Before discussing the findings, the modelling for testing Hypotheses 2a-3c on the moderating effects of firm 
age and size will be presented. Extending the above benchmark specification, Hypotheses 2a-3c were tested 
using the following: 
(𝟐𝟐) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�+ 𝛽𝛽3�𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�+ 𝛽𝛽5�(𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐) 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × �𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�� + 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 +  𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(𝟑𝟑) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�+ 𝛽𝛽3�𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�+ 𝛽𝛽5�(𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × �𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�� + 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 +  𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
The specification (2) corresponds to Hypotheses 2a-2c, and includes an interaction term between local 
governance and firm age.  Specification (3) is for the interaction with firm size. 
Likewise, for Hypotheses 4a-4c, the following augmented specification is used: 
(𝟒𝟒) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�+ 𝛽𝛽3�𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽4�𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽5�𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖�+ 𝛽𝛽6�(𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × �𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖�� + 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 +  𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
This specification includes the South dummy, which takes value of 1 if the province is in the South of Vietnam, 
and the interaction terms between local governance variables with this dummy. 
All the equations are first estimated using a fixed effect (FE) panel estimator, corrected by robust standard 
errors clustered on province level per year, relying on reghdfe routine for Stata11. Hausman tests for each 
specification indicate the appropriateness of the panel FE over the random effect estimator. Next, the GMM IV 
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panel estimator is applied. These are reported as models (1) to (3) below. However, for the specifications with 
the interaction terms, this paper uses only fixed effects (instead of the IV-GMM technique), because the use of 
IV-GMM on these specifications did not meet the over-identification tests. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
Regression results are reported in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. Columns (1), (2), and (3) correspond to the 
benchmark specification separately for the three local governance aspects: corruption, transparency, and 
proactivity. Columns (4) to (7) exhibits the results of the interaction between local governance and firm age; 
columns (8) to (11) are the interactions with firm size; and finally, the results of the interaction between the 
South dummy and local governance indicators are shown in columns (12) to (16). 
[Table 2.1 and 2.2 insert here] 
In all specifications, the coefficients of the three local governance variables are positive and precisely 
determined. This result is consistent with the hypothesis H1 that firms in regions with stronger local governance 
arrangements perform better in terms of revenue growth. 
Comparing the magnitude of the effects, transparency has the strongest impact on firm revenue growth. One 
point of transparency improvement leads to 2.1% revenue growth, all else being constant. Decrease in 
corruption has a slightly smaller impact, with 1.4% of total revenue growth for each point of corruption index 
reduction. Finally, leadership proactivity has the smallest economic influence on firm growth: 1 point of 
improvement in the index leads to 0.2% increase in total revenue growth. 
The negative and strongly significant coefficients of the interaction terms of local governance variables with 
firm age in columns (4) to (6), and with firm size in columns (7) to (9), are consistent with the hypotheses H2 
and H3: the effects of local governance on small and young firms are stronger than those on large and old firms. 
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In Appendix 2, we visualise the margins of revenue growth by firm age, size, and region12. As corruption 
diminishes, there is a positive effect on young firms and at the same time there is little effect on old firms. Next, 
there is a positive effect of diminished corruption on small firms, yet there is actually a negative effect of 
diminished corruption on large firms. This indicates that a corrupt environment gives a big advantage to large 
firms at the cost of small firms. Similar to rent seeking, corruption comes with high transaction costs, and in 
those deals, large firms benefit from economies of scale. The pattern corresponds to the one described by 
(VORLEY and WILLIAMS, 2016) for Bulgaria and Romania, where large firms benefit strongly from corrupt 
links with the government, to the cost of small firms. 
To explore the impact of being located in the South on revenue growth, the South dummy and the 
corresponding interaction terms are included in the regressions, and the results are presented in columns (13) to 
(16). The positive and significant coefficients of the dummy in all specifications indicate that firms established 
in South Vietnam perform better than those in North Vietnam. More importantly, the negative and precisely 
determined coefficients of the interaction terms between local governance variables and the South dummy 
indicate that the effect of local governance in the North is stronger than that in the South. Therefore, the 
hypothesis H4 is supported. The predictive margins of the corruption variable are presented in Appendix 2. 
Extension: the effect of legal policies 
While it was argued above that corruption, transparency and proactivity are the key dimensions of provincial 
level governance that affect the performance of SMEs, this paper also explored the impact of law enforcement. 
Here, we follow (MCCULLOCH et al., 2013) who used the corresponding indicator, labelled Legal Policies, in 
estimations of investment by Vietnamese firms and found it insignificant. The indicator corresponds to the 
perceived effectiveness of legal institutions.  
What is to be expected? Under conditions of the rule of law, effective law enforcement should have a positive 
impact. However, under an opaque legal system and administration, the incentives of adjudicators may become 
distorted. Punishment rather than the enforcement of justice may become the objective of an adjudicator 
(GLAESER et al., 2001). Under these conditions the impact of law enforcement may be ambiguous, and may 
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even be harmful on small and young firms. Findings reported in Appendix 3 are consistent with this intuition. In 
addition, the effectiveness of law enforcement appears to have no effect in the South, where it may be combined 
with a stronger pro-entrepreneurship culture, while it has a negative effect in the North. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper follows the call of WILLIAMSON (2000) to further develop the new institutional economics theory 
based on the transaction costs approach, by considering the impact of institutional levels on individual business 
performance.  Williamson delineates the institutional levels as follows: the first institutional level is culture; the 
second is the formal (constitutional level) institutions; and the third level is governance.  These three interact 
with the firms’ attributes to produce effects on business performance.  More specifically, by extending 
ROTHSTEIN and TEORELL (2008), this paper proposes that freedom from corruption, the extent of 
administrative transparency, and a degree of proactivity in designing and implementing entrepreneurship-
friendly policies are important arrangements of local governance.  This is especially the case in the context of 
an emerging market economy, and more specifically still for supporting the development of young and small 
firms. While most existing studies focus on the impact of country-wide institutional configurations, this paper 
argues that local governance quality may have a yet more significant influence on the local entrepreneurship 
sector. This argument is based on an observation that young and small firms are typically geographically 
constrained to local business environments, which in turn are strongly shaped by local governance structures. 
Indeed, it is found that local governance quality - including corruption, transparency, and proactivity - may be 
important determinants of local SMEs’ growth performance. 
At the same time, the results suggest that local governance matters more for young and small businesses. Old 
and large firms, with their accumulated capital and resources, are less sensitive to the vagaries of local 
governance. More than that, the pattern of the results suggests that corruption, while significantly constraining 
the growth of small companies, may actually be beneficial to large companies. This is consistent with the 
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findings and argument of VORLEY and WILLIAMS (2016), who see corruption as something more than just 
an imposition inflicted by the government administration on small companies, but rather as a collusion between 
large companies and the government against small firms and newcomers. Likewise, HUSTED (1994), utilising 
the transaction costs approach, argues that ‘parochial’ corruption (more idiosyncratically corrupt trasactions of 
higher signifiance) is supported by relational capital based on multiple transactions. As argued here, that again 
gives an advantage to large and established companies. 
This paper also examines the interplay between informal institutions and local governance quality. It is expected 
- in line with the institutional theory - that a pro-entrepreneurial culture could moderate the effects of local 
governance. Indeed, empirical results indicate that local governance quality matters more where, historically, 
local institutions were less supportive to entrepreneurship. 
It is proposed that the effect of governance institutions is salient at sub-national levels because governance is 
more concerned with how governments deliver policies, rather than with what they deliver (ROTHSTEIN and 
TEORELL, 2008). Local governments are more involved in the delivery process because they are at the end of 
the governance system, being in charge of implementing and enforcing central policies. At the same time, as 
already argued, this conclusion may be specific to constitutional settings, where the lack of effective constraints 
on the executive branch of the government is to some extent compensated for by ‘market preserving federalism’ 
(WEINGAST, 1995) and elements of meritocracy, so that the regional authorities retain a degree of autonomy 
and are incentivized to support regional development. These conditions are characteristics of China and 
Vietnam, but do not hold in Russia for example (DU and MICKIEWICZ, 2016). A call for more comparative 
studies follows immediately from this observation. 
This constitutional feature of ‘market preserving federalism’ helps to explain why the results show that besides 
freedom from corruption and transparency, the proactivity of local governments also plays an important role in 
enhancing business performance. Again, it would be interesting to explore the extent to which the proactive 
24 
 
leadership of local governments towards local entrepreneurship sectors is important in other emerging countries, 
where institutional frameworks may differ.  
It follows that findings in this paper have implications for policymakers in transition economies. Even where 
the institutional settings are weak, local governments may create a more even playing field for local firms. 
Importantly, the findings suggest that in regions with an initially weaker pro-entrepreneurial culture, local 
governments could particularly help in facilitating entrepreneurship. To entrepreneurs, the commitment and 
stability in the policies of local governments could, to some extent, introduce similar incentives and trust as do 
the (absent) pro-entrepreneurial informal institutions. Bearing in mind the fact that informal institutions take 
time to change, local governance could and should be the instrument that transition economy governments 
utilize in order to maintain and accelerate the development of their entrepreneurship sector, which ultimately 
may become the growth engine of the whole economy. 
This study has some important limitations that future research may want to address.  
First, as already discussed, the findings in this study may be country-specific. Especially in the case of Vietnam, 
great power is centralised at the local leader’s disposal but, as in China, there are also meritocratic elements of 
regional political competition, based on delivering positive effects on regional development. Therefore, future 
research investigating the informal forces of local governance may want to examine other economies with 
different political systems and traditions. For example, Brazil and Russia may be interesting candidates for 
comparison with Vietnam and China, utilising the new framework of institutional economics – transaction 
costs. Brazil’s constitution combines federalism with a higher degree of democratic accountability for its 
leaders. In Russia, there is no democratic accountability, and no federalism except in name, and the incentives 
for local governors may not prioritise economic development (on both countries, see: AIDIS et al., 2008). How 
these different conditions play out and affect local business performance at a micro level remains an interesting 
question.  
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Last but not least, future research concerning the persistence of regional cultures across the South and the North 
of Vietnam, could make use of a richer set of variables in addition to using dummies. And accounting for a 
number of additional differences between the regions, such as location, demographic, and economic factors, 
could be interesting and further investigate the robustness of the results on the effects of institutional persistence 
on micro performance. More generally, there is still a scarcity of multilevel conceptualisations and empirical 
studies on regional entrepreneurial sectors (BOSMA, 2017; FRITSCH and STOREY, 2014; STERNBERG, 
2012; TUROK et al., 2017), and this paper is a minor step in that direction.  
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Table 1: Variable definitions and summary statistics 
 
Note: Studying panel encompasses all 63 provinces and municipal cities in Vietnam in 2006-2012. Governance variables were 
obtained from Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) dataset. Firm-specific variables were obtained from Annual Enterprises Survey 
of the General Statistical Office. All values are depreciated using official inflation rate (2010 prices).  
Variable Definition Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Revenue growth The percentage change of sales revenue growth 
between two consecutive years: ln (revenue)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −ln (revenue)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 0.05 1.41 -12.35 12.34 
Age Years of operation since establishment 6.67 5.44 1 33 
Ownership Code “1” state-owned SMEs, code “2” private 
SMEs, code “3” foreign-owned SMEs 1.98 0.32 1 3 
Size Natural log of the number of employees (reported the 
number of employees) 43.84 70.08 10 475 
Assets structure The ratio of firm fixed assets to total assets 0.24 0.25 0 0.94 
Owner age Age of the owner of the firm 44.64 9.88 16 90 
Owner gender Code “1” male, code “2” female  0.70 0.46 0 1 
Provincial 
construction 
The value of spending for local infrastructure 
systems, in million VND per capita 9.32 6.76 0.59 37.94 
Provincial 
consumption 
The value of average consumption of a province in a 
year, in billion VND per capita 24.13 14.64 2.01 50.58 
Cumulative 
value of FDI 
Cumulative value of FDI of a province in a year, in 
billion VND per capita 667.82 568.94 0.14 2561.76 
Value of SOEs 
capital 
Value of state-owned firms of a province in a year, in 
billion VND per capita 88.32 145.91 0.43 634.42 
Distance Distance from a province to the closet economic 
centre, in km 91.68 123.74 1 499 
Corruption The difference of the Informal charges indicator in 
two consecutive years: Informal charges𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −Informal charges𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 0.04 0.83 -3.39 3.62 
Transparency The difference of the Transparency indicator in two 
consecutive years: Transparency𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −Transparency𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 -0.05 0.62 -2.99 3.05 
Proactivity The difference of the Proactivity indicator in two 
consecutive years: Proactivity𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − Proactivity𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 -0.22 1.10 -5.46 6.18 
Legal Policies The difference of the Legal institutions indicator in 
two consecutive years: Legal institutions𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −Legal institutions𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 -.2245 1.501 -3.738 4.020 
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Table 2.1: Regression results  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Firm age -0.002* -0.026*** -0.023*** -0.057*** -0.074*** -0.054*** -0.061*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) 
Firm size 0.112*** 0.078*** 0.095*** 0.207*** 0.205*** 0.207*** 0.206*** 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) 
Assets structure -0.022 0.019 0.039*** -0.112*** -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.110*** 
(0.030) (0.016) (0.012) (-0.030) (-0.030) (-0.030) (-0.030) 
Owner age -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.064*** -0.053*** -0.072*** -0.070*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) 
Owner gender 0.058*** 0.084*** 0.063*** 0.199*** 0.192*** 0.200*** 0.189*** 
(0.019) (0.009) (0.007) (-0.022) (-0.022) (-0.022) (-0.022) 
Provincial 
construction 
-0.012 -0.009*** -0.002 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 
(0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) 
Provincial 
consumption 
0.019*** -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.060*** 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.056*** 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) 
Distance -0.000** -0.001*** -0.000*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) 
Value FDI -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Value SOEs -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Transparency 2.066***   0.0638*** 
  
0.0242*** 
(0.300)   (-0.007 
  
(-0.007 
Corruption  1.436***  
 
0.141*** 
 
0.127*** 
 (0.103)  
 
(-0.008 
 
(-0.009 
Proactivity   0.230*** 
  
0.044*** 0.015*** 
  (0.035) 
  
(-0.005 (-0.005 
Transparency × Firm 
age 
  -0.005*** 
  
-0.001**   
  (-0.001) 
  
(-0.001 
Corruption × Firm age 
  
  
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.005***   
  
 
(-0.001) 
 
(-0.001 
Proactivity × Firm age 
  
  
  
-0.005*** -0.003*** 
          (0.000) (0.000) 
Hausman p_value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 307,591 307,591 307,591 307,591 307,591 307,591 307,591 
Hansen (J) p_value 0.35 0.93 0.84 NA NA NA NA 
Mean VIF 3.83 4.08 4.03 4.14 4.16 4.15 4.13 
R-squared NA NA NA 0.350 0.352 0.350 0.352 
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Table 2.2: Regression results (continue)  
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Firm age -0.066*** -0.072*** -0.066*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.073*** -0.078*** -0.073*** -0.079*** (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) 
Firm size 0.208*** 0.213*** 0.194*** 0.208*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.205*** 0.206*** 0.205*** (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.009) 
Assets structure -0.113*** -0.115*** -0.110*** -0.115*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.110*** -0.113*** -0.111*** (-0.030) (-0.030) (-0.030) (-0.030) (-0.030) (-0.030) (-0.030) (-0.030) (-0.030) 
Owner age -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.052*** -0.046*** (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) 
Owner gender 0.190*** 0.153*** 0.188*** 0.147*** 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.199*** 0.205*** 0.198*** (-0.022) (-0.022) (-0.022) (-0.022) (-0.022) (-0.022) (-0.022) (-0.022) (-0.022) 
Provincial 
construction 
0.028*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 
(-0.002 (-0.002 (-0.002 (-0.002 (-0.002 (-0.002 (-0.002 (-0.002 (-0.002 
Provincial 
consumption 
0.059*** 0.054*** 0.061*** 0.054*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.062*** 0.058*** 
(-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) 
Distance 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006*** (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) 
Value FDI -0.070*** -0.067*** -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.072*** -0.075*** -0.069*** -0.073*** -0.069*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Value SOEs 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Transparency 0.201*** 
  
0.023 
 
0.048*** 
  
0.019*** 
(-0.016) 
  
(-0.016) 
 
(-0.006) 
  
(-0.006) 
Corruption 
 
0.522*** 
 
0.492*** 
  
0.117*** 
 
0.116***  
(-0.018) 
 
(-0.018) 
  
(-0.007) 
 
(-0.007) 
Proactivity 
  
0.177*** 0.060*** 
   
0.011** -0.016***   
(-0.010) (-0.010) 
   
(-0.004) (-0.005) 
Transparency × 
Firm size 
-0.051*** 
  
-0.003 
     
(-0.004) 
  
(-0.004) 
     
Corruption × Firm 
size 
 
-0.125*** 
 
-0.115*** 
     
 
(-0.004) 
 
(-0.004) 
     
Proactivity × Firm 
size 
  
-0.051*** -0.023*** 
     
  
(-0.003) (-0.003) 
     
South 
    
1.246*** 1.250*** 1.168*** 1.238*** 1.161***     
(-0.427) (-0.426) (-0.427) (-0.427) (-0.427) 
Transparency*South 
     
-0.066*** 
  
-0.0153*      
(-0.008) 
  
(-0.009) 
Corruption*South 
      
-0.089*** 
 
-0.082***       
(-0.009) 
 
(-0.009) 
Proactivity*South 
       
-0.026*** 0.00134 
              (-0.006) (-0.006) 
Hausman p_value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 307,591 307,591 307,591 307,591 307,591 307,591 307,591 307,591 307,591 
Mean VIF 4.53 4.55 4.54 5.38 4.19 4.13 4.15 4.17 4.09 
R-squared 0.350 0.356 0.351 0.357 0.350 0.350 0.352 0.350 0.352 
Note: Results in columns (1) to (3) were estimated using IV-GMM estimator (routine ivreg2 with gmm2s option in Stata). The results 
in columns (3) to (16) were estimated using fixed effect panel estimator (routine reghdfe in Stata). All specifications include year 
dummies, 2-digit industry dummies, and ownership dummies (private, state-owned and foreign-owned). The figures reported in 
parentheses are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) robust standard errors, clustered by region per year. Hausman test 
statistics are reported for the endogeneity of fixed effects. *** indicates significant at 1%. ** indicates significant at 5%. * indicates 
significant at 10%. 
Appendix A: Governance index definition and summary statistics 
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Note: Studying panel encompasses all of 63 provinces and municipal cities in Vietnam in the period 2006-2012, obtained from the 
Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI). 
 
  
Variable Definition Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Corruption Measures how much firms pay in informal charges, how much of 
an obstacle those extra fees pose for their business operations, 
whether payment of those extra fees results in expected results or 
"services," and whether provincial officials use compliance with 
local regulations to extract rents. The indicator is two-digit value, 
ranging from 1 to 10, the higher the score, the lower the charges 
(corruption). 
6.48 0.80 4.52 8.62 
Transparency Measures whether firms have access to the proper planning and 
legal documents necessary to run their businesses, whether those 
documents are equitably available, new policies and laws are 
communicated to firms and predictably implemented. The indicator 
is two-digit value, ranging from 1 to 10, the higher the score, the 
more transparent. 
5.79 0.97 2.15 8.85 
Proactivity Measures the creativity and cleverness of provinces in 
implementing central policy, designing their own initiatives for 
private sector development, and working within sometimes unclear 
national regulatory frameworks to assist and interpret in favour of 
local private firms. The indicator is two-digit value, ranging from 1 
to 10, the higher the score, the more proactive.  
5.05 1.46 1.39 9.39 
Legal Policies Measures the private sector's confidence in provincial legal 
institutions; whether firms regard provincial legal institutions as an 
effective vehicle for dispute resolution, or as an avenue for lodging 
appeals against corrupt official behaviour. The indicator is two-digit 
value, ranging from 1 to 10, the higher the score, the more proactive. 
4.60 1.16 2.00 7.34 
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Appendix B: Predictive margins of revenue growth on firm age, size, and region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Graph B1: Firm age 
Graph B2: Firm size 
Graph B3: Regions 
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Appendix C:  Estimates of sales growth with Legal Policies included as governance indicator 
 
VARIABLES: (1) (2) (3) 
Firm age -0.042*** -0.059*** -0.081*** 
 (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) 
Firm size 0.206*** 0.140*** 0.207*** 
 (-0.009) (-0.010) (-0.009) 
Asset structure -0.111*** -0.109*** -0.114*** 
 (-0.030) (-0.030) (-0.030) 
SOEs -0.199*** -0.214*** -0.224*** 
 (-0.050) (-0.051) (-0.051) 
FOEs -0.246 -0.21 -0.244 
 (-0.222) (-0.222) (-0.219) 
Owner age -0.081*** -0.0613*** -0.027*** 
 (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.010) 
Owner gender 0.161*** 0.124*** 0.172*** 
 (-0.022) (-0.022) (-0.022) 
Provincial construction 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 
 (-0.002) (-0.002) -0.002) 
Provincial consumption 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.048*** 
 (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) 
Distance 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) 
Cumulative FDI value -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cumulative SOE value 0.00*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (-0.000) (-0.000) (-0.000) 
Legal policies -0.151*** -0.461*** -0.127*** 
 (-0.007) (-0.016) (-0.006) 
Legal policies*firm age 0.001***   
 (-0.001)   
Legal policies*firm size  0.110***  
  (-0.004)  
South   1.172*** 
     (-0.430) 
Legal policies*South   0.127*** 
   (0.007) 
Hausman p_value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 307,591 307,591 307,591 
R-squared 0.352 0.357 0.351 
Note: The results were estimated using fixed effect panel estimator (routine reghdfe in Stata). All specifications include 7-year 
dummies, 2-digit industry dummies, and 3 ownership dummies (private, state-owned and foreign-owned). The figure reported in 
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by region per year. Hausman test statistics are reported for the endogeneity of fixed 
effects. *** indicates significant at 1%. ** indicates significant at 5%. * indicates significant at 10%. 
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1 Here, the entrepreneurship sector is understood as young, small and private companies, following DU J. and MICKIEWICZ T. 
(2016) Subsidies, rent seeking and performance: Being young, small or private in China, Journal of Business Venturing 31, 22-38.. 
2 See however: AUDRETSCH D. B., BELITSKI M. and DESAI S. (2015) Entrepreneurship and economic development in cities, The 
Annals of Regional Science 55, 33-60. 
3 Source: https://www.gso.gov.vn/Default_en.aspx?tabid=515  
4 Doimoi is the term describing the radical economic transformation in Vietnam that started from 1986. 
5 Details of PCI methodology please visit www.eng.pcivietnam.org.  
6 According to the Vietnam Enterprise Law, there are 4 types of firms in terms of size. Microenterprises are firms operating with fewer 
than 10 employees. Small enterprises are firms having 10 to 200 employees and total registered capital less than 20 billion VND 
(approximately 1 million USD). Medium enterprises are firms having 200-300 employees and total registered capital less than 100 
billion VND (approximately 5 million USD). And large enterprises are firms operating with more than 300 employees and 100 billion 
VND registered capital. Capital is the first criterion in categorization. 
7 We test the robustness of the results by running the regressions using profitability as dependent variables, including Earning after 
tax, earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), ROS, and ROA. We use both IV-GMM and FE estimators. The results overall support 
our main hypothesis concerning the positive effects of local governance on local SMEs’ performance. These are available on request.   
8 In Vietnam, there are five large economic centres, administratively defined as municipalities: Hanoi, Haiphong, Hochiminh, Danang, 
and Cantho. 
9 The command in Stata is ivreg2 with the two-step feasible GMM estimation (gmm2s option). 
10 Short tenure may also trigger more corruption. If officials know that they just hold the position in short time (just one term, for 
instance), they may try to reap maximum benefit from their power. 
11 The use of the reghdfe is appropriate for multiple levels of fixed effects. The routine uses a robust algorithm to efficiently absorb the 
fixed effects from different levels of observations, and by default iteratively removes singleton groups to avoid biasing the standard 
errors, see CORREIA S. (2014) Explanation of the HDFE iteration 3 FEs, Duke University, mimeo.. 
12 For the sake of saving space, this paper exhibits the predictive margins of the corruption variable only. The predictive margins of 
the other governance variables (transparency and proactivity) are similar to those of corruption. These graphs are available on request. 
                                                          
